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Future Forecasts

Contingency Planning and an Air Force
Space Command Information System
Maj Kaylin Freedman, USAF
Michael R. Grimaila, PhD, AFIT

I

t is a quiet afternoon. You are sitting in your ofﬁce thinking about how many wings in Air Force Space Command
(AFSPC) utilize electronic databases to enter and track operational training, evaluation, and Crew Force Management (CFM)
data. This data directly supports the missions of the units by
meeting regulatory requirements to maintain proﬁciency and
qualiﬁcations, ensuring only personnel meeting the physical
requirements perform shifts, determining crew member proﬁciency for advancement within the unit, and enabling analysis
of data to improve operations. No single, common system is in
use across the command. The databases in use are not consolidated or standardized and do not interface. This is not efﬁcient
and a new system would offer advantages.
You look out the window and envision the accolades you
will get if you propose a single, common training, evaluation,
and CFM information system and wonder what leadership
could possibly fear about a proposal such as this one. Suddenly
the phone rings, the site administrator for your single, common
information system is on the line wanting to know if you have
seen the news and would like your opinion on what to do next.
Every phone line in your ofﬁce starts ringing. Your ﬂustered assistant runs in. You do not know what to do. You put everyone
on hold as your assistant explains that a tornado has touched
down in Colorado Springs. The building that houses the servers for your system for the entire command was destroyed. The
loss of the system means that eight wings and one group, comprising 38 operational units, will have to spend an unspeakable
number of man-hours to reproduce, to retrain, and possibly reevaluate over 3,000 operators. Even worse, a data loss could
compromise the weapon systems because without the data the
units would no longer know who is physically and proﬁciency
qualiﬁed to perform a shift. For the three Intercontinental Ballistic Missile bases, this means a nuclear surety incident could
occur which would result in a reduction of alert rate for the
ﬁrst time in over 50 years. As you are thinking about what
this means for AFSPC and the country, the commander enters
your ofﬁce. You know the commander is looking for answers,
but you simply stare speechlessly. Every minute that ticks by
you know the units are falling behind, nuclear surety is possibly compromised, and precious manpower is being wasted.
The commander is furious and tells you to grab a box and start
packing.
The phone rings again, and you realize you were daydreaming. There is no crisis, but now you realize that leadership
might resist your idea of a single, common training, evaluation,
and CFM information system because of the risk of losing the
High Frontier

data due to a contingency such as a natural disaster. So, before
you start a proposal for AFSPC, you decide to examine what is
necessary to reduce the risk associated with a critical information system and contingencies.
Overview
Building contingency plans calms fears regarding potential
losses of information systems which are critical to an organization and vital to the operationʼs continued success in a time of
crisis; the drama demonstrated above provides just some of the
results of not planning ahead. For the purposes of this discussion, the focus of the contingency planning is mainly on the
impact to information systems and not the impact on people.
Although the impact on people is important, military units are
required to maintain disaster preparedness plans which already
focus on what steps leadership and subordinates should take
during disasters to assist with personnel requirements such as
ﬁrst aid, and assembly points. The term “contingency” refers
to an event which makes usage of an information system, asset
or process, not possible for a period of time or permanently. A
contingency does not include an event which precludes usage
of an information system as a result of a security issue such as
a compromise or malicious attack.
This article will illustrate that a contingency plan reduces
risk by examining the impact on civilian organizations and providing examples from 11 September 2001. We then examine
the purpose of risk assessment and a technique for conducting
risk assessment. A planner cannot properly design a contingency plan until the risk and potential losses are determined
because these factors establish the need for a plan. Finally, we
provide a guide for constructing a contingency plan. The planner must adhere to a guide to build the plan in order to ensure
that it encompasses what is necessary for survival and to ensure
the plan is thorough. This article is not all-inclusive, and it is
important to note there are a variety of approaches to contingency plans and procedures; the purpose here is to highlight the
importance of developing and using a contingency plan and to
provide an insight into the overall process of contingency plan
construction.
Why Contingency Plans Are Critical
The role of information and the systems providing the information in todayʼs society are vital. The vast majority of
organizations would not be able to function without information, and if information were lost, it could be detrimental to
operations. In 2000, Price Waterhouse Coopers reported “that
90 percent of all companies that experience a computer ʻdisasterʼ with no pre-existing survival plan go out of business
within 18 months.”1 The survival rate of organizations without
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a pre-existing contingency plan seems extremely low, and Price
Waterhouseʼs data would be suspect if other institutions did not
report similar results. However, the Hartford Insurance Company found that “on average, over 40 percent of businesses that
do not have a disaster plan go out of business after a major loss
like a ﬁre, a break-in, or a storm.”2 Gartner Dataquest further
substantiated the ﬁndings by reporting that “two out of ﬁve enterprises that experience a disaster go out of business within
ﬁve years.”3 Organizations that understand the criticality of
contingency plans devote the necessary resources to ensure
they are available when needed. According to Donna Scott,
a consultant with Gartner Group, banks expend seven to eight
percent of their data center budgets on disaster recovery.4 The
number of organizations predicted to fail due to a contingency
are astounding, and the amount ﬁnancial institutions expend on
contingency plans highlight the importance of having a solid
plan in place.
Unfortunately, 11 September 2001 illustrated why contingency plans are critical. Due to the visibility and the centralization of ﬁnancial institutions in the World Trade Center, their
destruction and the impact widely increased the impact of the
desolation. Many companies could not function for days while
others were able to return to operations within hours. Deutsche
Bank had to evacuate over 5,000 employees, and lost ofﬁces
and all equipment, but were operational within two hours. A
bank spokesperson said, “Our plans worked well, our systems
came back up; we were well prepared.”5 Unfortunately, others
were not as lucky.
The most signiﬁcant and common technology failure was
the loss of telecommunication. This factor severely hampered
disaster recovery for many organizations: “Two major Verizon
points-of-presence were located in the World Trade Center
complex, and damage was also sustained by a nearby switching
unit.”6 Organizations attempting to restore operations and who
relied on telecommunications for data transfers and customer
support were severely hampered by the reduction in capabilities. An additional crippling factor was the lack of redundancy.
Todd Gordon, vice president and general manger for business
continuity and recovery services at IBM, said, “There was too
much concentration of trafﬁc over networks at one Verizon site”
and added that organizations will “require greater redundancy
in telecommunications and networking in the future.”7
Another issue that companies experienced was the complete loss of systems and vital information infrastructure. This
caused signiﬁcant and challenging problems: ofﬁce space had to
be secured, equipment located, and systems built. Leslie Hunt,
chief information ofﬁcer of the Greater New York chapter of
the Red Cross, highlighted the importance of having plans in
place to establish systems for people to use. Her ofﬁce had lost
everything, and had no plan for how to obtain equipment. Hunt
was able to secure 12 computers, create local area network and
wide area network, and proceed to work on making the e-mail
servers function.8 However, without a plan, the cannibalized
system was fragile and vulnerable. The computers and network were not properly conﬁgured and, in the end, could not
handle the workload. The Greater New York Website crashed
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several times and a virus infected the e-mail server, making the
systems inoperable for a period of time.9 For the survivors of
11 September, the Red Cross provided an essential source of
information, and without the website and e-mail the Red Cross
was crippled. Hunt pointed out the need to have plans which
ensure the systems are in place during a disaster so that people
can do their jobs “without having to worry about the technology they are using.”10
Risk Assessment
When the organization is undergoing a contingency, it is not
the time to try to determine what information systems are the
most critical. In order to avoid this, organizations must conduct
a risk assessment prior to a contingency plan being composed
or in concert with the initial steps. The assessment should entail
determining the organizationʼs assets and processes, assigning
a value to the assets and processes, identifying possible contingencies the organization faces, and assembling a detailed report
which provides recommendations for building the contingency
plan. The risk assessment will ensure the need for a contingency plan is determined before manning is expended on drafting
one, and a risk assessment will also ensure the focus of the plan
is on the systems the organization has assessed as critical to the
organizationʼs operations. A planner can conduct risk assessment or management in a number of ways. The methods are
very similar and serve the same goal of helping the organization
understand, manage, and reduce the risks encountered in conducting their mission. The process described here is based on
the steps highlighted by Michael Erbschloe, author of “Guide
to Disaster Recovery.” Figure 1 displays the steps involved:
Identify assets
and processes

Rank order
assets

Identify and
classify
contingencies

Build risk
assessment
report

Figure 1: Risk Assessment Steps.

One of the ﬁrst steps of risk assessment is to identify what
assets the organization possesses and the processes used to conduct operations. This means conducting an inventory of every
piece of equipment the organization has and documenting the
processes that the organization accomplishes in order to fulﬁll
its mission. Erbschloe suggests an organization conduct an exposure inventory which lists “all facilities, processes, systems,
and resources that an organization uses to maintain operations
and sustain revenue” and includes physical facilities, personnel, equipment, installed systems, information technology, ofﬁce equipment, and products or parts.11 Once the equipment
is identiﬁed, the organization must be aware of how the inventory is used so that during a contingency the right equipment
is made available to the right people so the right tasks are accomplished to ensure continued operations. Erbschloe identiﬁes this as the “business processes inventory” and clariﬁes that
it must include: “how a process works, the facilities and buildings in which the process occurs, the departments that perform
the process, the personnel who work in the departments, the
equipment used by the departments, the installed systems on
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which the departments rely, the information technology that the
departments have in place, and the parts and supplies that the
departments need to accomplish their work.”12
Once planners know what assets are in the organization, they
need to know which ones require the most protection. The organization must carefully rank order its assets. During a crisis,
people should not spend valuable time determining what equipment is critical to operations and what should be saved. Determining the value of systems in the military can be problematic
because there is no proﬁt affected and sometimes no identiﬁable customer impacted. The planner for a military unit needs
to assess the value of the assets or processes based on support
to the mission. Can the mission be accomplished without the
asset or process? If not, the value is high and the asset or process should earn the highest value of 10. If the answer is yes,
the planner must determine at what point the asset or process
does affect the ability of the unit to perform the mission and
assign a value based upon this assessment. According to this
model, the greater the number of hours between the assets or
processes inoperability and the resulting impact on the mission
then the lower the value (determining the spread of the size of
the value awarded would be contingent to the number of assets
and processes). In other words, a system which would impact
the mission in eight hours if the system is not operable would
garner a value of eight, whereas a system which would impact
the mission in 16 hours if the system is not operable would be
given a ﬁve.
Once the assets and processes at risk are identiﬁed and the
value is known, the planner must list and classify the possible
contingencies. Peter G. Neumann, moderator of the online
ACM Risks Forum, noted that organizations, especially governments, build plans to meet the situations of the past instead
of designing plans to meet the potential new situation.13 One
way to avoid this trap is for the planner to ensure all contingencies are classiﬁed even though the utility may initially seem
insigniﬁcant. Listing and classifying all possible contingencies
regardless of the probability will actually improve the process
by ensuring the organization is prepared for all possibilities and
not just the known or most recent ones.
Michael Whitman and Herbert J. Mattord, authors of “Managing Information Security,” provide a method to accomplish
this task. The planner should separate natural disasters from
man-made disasters and list the event followed by the suspected effect on information systems.14 Erbschloe recommends another process of grouping threats by recurring natural disasters,
accidents, and “destructive or disruptive deliberate actions” and
classifying as catastrophic, major, and minor.15 Comprehensive
Consulting Solutions, however, suggests creating three different categories for classiﬁcation. Category I represents the least
serious threats that only last for a few hours, such as a brief
loss of power. Category II consists of “localized man-made
disasters and natural disasters of a more serious nature” with
effects lasting for days or weeks. Category III consists of widespread events such as earthquakes or ﬂooding with the potential
to have an impact for weeks.16
Each of the proposed methods is adequate but when comHigh Frontier

bined they provide a better picture for the planner. The planner
should categorize the threats utilizing the numbering system of
Comprehensive Consulting Solutions, identify the categories
utilizing Erbschloeʼs categories, and add the suspected effect as
Whitman and Mattord suggest. The resulting categories would
be as follows: Category I, accidents; Category II, minor natural
or human-made disasters; Category III, major human-made or
natural disasters; and Category IV, widespread or catastrophic
events. Part of identifying and classifying the contingencies is
determining the likelihood of the event occurring. The planner
must research the probability and devise a probability rating to
be included for each contingency. The likelihood of a contingency occurring can be determined by contacting local agencies
and conducting research on, for example, ﬂood plains, weather
patterns, fault lines, power outages, or grid construction.
Once this research is complete, the planner must tie all of
this information together. Erbschole deﬁnes this activity as the
risk assessment report. This consists of describing the “asset or
business process that is exposed to risk, the risks themselves,
and the effectiveness of existing systems designed to mitigate
these risks.”17 The report is the process of compiling the ﬁrst
three steps described and next determining if the organizationʼs
procedures reduce or eliminate the risks identiﬁed. Initially,
the planner should focus on developing a risk assessment report
for the critical assets and processes. When time permits, the
planner can return to this step and complete it for those assets
and processes that are not as critical. Completing this step and
moving to developing a contingency plan should not be delayed
in order to accomplish a risk assessment report on low value
assets and processes.
Erbschloe also warns that a risk assessment report may contain proprietary information due to its comprehensive details,
and organizations should treat the reports as conﬁdential. The
planning team will require the reports and leadership may want
to review them, but minimal dissemination is ideal due to the
detailed content.
Building a Contingency Plan and Beyond
After the planner has assessed risk, the actual contingency
plans can be written. A number of different methodologies for
writing plans exist and most of them are very similar. “Management of Information Security” presents a comprehensive
and usable contingency plan model. This model leads the planner through a logical procession from a minor contingency, to
a major, to a catastrophic and describes how to construct plans
to address each type. What follows is a broad overview of the
model.
According to “Managing Information Security,” the
contingency plan consists of three components: the incident
response plan, the disaster recovery plan, and the business
continuity plan. An organization must develop each component
for each category of contingency identiﬁed during the risk
assessment phase. This will ensure that personnel are clear on
the required steps and procedures to take during a contingency.
As William A. Hussong, Jr., the senior member of the
professional staff of the special operations division of System
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Research Applications, Inc., explains, “The plan must basically
outline peopleʼs responsibilities, the use of equipment and other
material resources, and detailed operating instructions; nothing
can be assumed. The plan is the organizationʼs strategic battle
plan for recovery… [and the components] …become the
organizationʼs tactical battle plans for survival.”18
The ﬁrst, and the largest, component of the contingency plan
is the Incident Response Plan (IRP). This is a reactive measure that “comprises a detailed set of processes and procedures
that anticipate, detect, and mitigate the effects of an unexpected
event that might compromise information resources and assets.”19 It is the starting point for all events and includes a set of
procedures for personnel to follow. If at all possible, a contingency should be contained and kept at what was deﬁned as the
minor - Category I or II - level with the goal to address it before
it becomes a major event. To accomplish this task, the incident
response plan must detail the procedures for personnel and the
organization to take during, after, and before a contingency occurs. The actions taken are function-speciﬁc and are grouped
and speciﬁcally assigned to individuals.20
The IRP is the ﬁrst component of a contingency plan, and a
Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is the second. This plan is enacted when a natural or human-made event occurs in which the
organization cannot control the impact of an event or the level
of damage is so severe that the organization cannot quickly recovery.21 The DRP plan focuses on preparing for a disaster so
that restoring operations and recovery is quickly possible. The
plan must address all category levels of contingencies identiﬁed during the risk assessment phase. However, the planner
must understand that even though the major and catastrophic
contingencies - Category III and Category IV - have a lower
probability of occurring, they can have the most overwhelming
impact to an organization.
The key points of the DRP are “clear delegation of roles and
responsibilities,” “execution of the alert roster and notiﬁcation
of key personnel,” “clear establishment of priorities,” “documentation of the disaster,” “inclusion of action steps to mitigate
the impact of the disaster on the operations of the organization,” and “inclusion of alternative implementations for the various systems components, should primary versions be unavailable.”22 The DRP focuses on restoring normal operations to the
organization as quickly as possible and includes crisis management steps. The crisis management actions are those “that deal
primarily with the people involved” and comprise of detailing
public affairs responses, handling emotional issues, and verifying personnel status.23 The disaster recovery plan prepares the
organization to restore operations when the primary operating
location is still intact.
When a contingency is so catastrophic that an organization
is unable to operate out of its primary location, then the last
component of the contingency plan, the Business Continuity
Plan (BCP), must be enacted. This plan includes the strategies to ensure the company can continue to perform its mission
and continue to function during a contingency, regardless of
the magnitude, and is usually managed by the leadership.24 The
BCP is critical because an organization must continue to per79

form its mission or the organization risks going out of business,
which for a military organization could impact the security of
the entire nation or worse. The key here is developing plans to
ensure the most mission critical assets or processes are able to
continue to function or to ensure they can be quickly restored
regardless of the occurrence of a contingency.
Restoring assets and processes is possible by taking precontingency actions to protect the information. Accomplishing
this serves several purposes such as ensuring that data critical
to the organizationʼs mission is available, guaranteeing facilities are available, and reducing risk. The organization should
conduct pre-contingency actions on those high value assets and
processes identiﬁed in the risk assessment phase.
As mentioned above, the organizationʼs assets and processes
were ranked based upon their value to mission performance.
The planner used this information, budgetary constraints, and
acceptable risk levels to evaluate which options work best for
contingency. Six available options are suggested: hot site,
warm site, cold site, timeshare, service bureau, and mutual
agreement. The ﬁrst three options are “exclusive-use” (only
the organization can use the site) and the remaining options are
shared-use. “A hot site is a fully conﬁgured computer facility,
[and it has]…all services, communication links, and physical
plant operations” available.25 Although this option is expensive, it provides instant recovery of data and operations can
continue almost seamlessly (assuming the hot site is not also
impacted by the contingency). The next option is a warm site
which “provides many of the same services and options as the
hot site, but typically software applications either are not included, or are not installed and conﬁgured.”26 Finally, a cold
site, the least expensive option, consists of “only rudimentary
services and facilities” and is essentially “an empty room with
standard heating, air conditioning, and electrical services.”27
Shared-use options, unlike exclusive-use, mean that the organization shares usage of the facility or services with another
organization. The timeshare option can be a hot, warm, or cold
site, “but it is leased in conjunction with a business partner or
sister organization.”28 Success is contingent upon the partner
or sister organizationʼs cooperation and adherence to the timeshare agreement. A service bureau can be employed and is “a
service agency that provides a service for a fee” such as data
storage or ﬂoor space.29 The ﬁnal option is the mutual agreement which “is a contract between two organizations in which
each party agrees to assist the other in the event of a disaster.”30
An organization chooses which option is right for them based
upon what expense it can support, what level of risk it is willing
to accept, and the timeframe of desired operational recovery.
All of the options require the ability to access the organizationʼs data, information systems, and processes in order to operate. There are three different methods of storing or protecting
the data, information systems, and processes. One of these is
electronic vaulting: “the bulk batch-transfer of data to an offsite facility.”31 The organization periodically conducts a batchtransfer of data to a server at another location. Except that the
server is located off site, this is similar to a traditional back up;
the data is only as current as the latest transfer. Remote journHigh Frontier

aling, another option, transfers “live transactions to an off-site
facility” so the transaction is current, but it does not transfer
the archived data.32 The last and most comprehensive option
is data shadowing which “combines electronic vaulting with
remote journaling, by writing multiple copies of the database
simultaneously in two separate locations.”33 Although data
shadowing is expensive, it is the most thorough, will reduce the
time required to recover operations, and ensures proﬁt loss and
mission impact is minimal.
Once the planner writes the contingency plans, they must
be tested and updated on a regular basis to ensure currency,
accuracy, feasibility, and applicability. Although many organizations affected on 11 September had contingency plans, many
were not usable. A consultant at Strohl Systems, a recovery
software and services ﬁrm, explained that “in some cases, the
plans were too big and ignored detailed issues-where to meet,
how to contact people, having a disaster hotline that works
when all phone systems are down.”34 The senior vice president
of ﬁeld operations at Comdisco, a contingency services provider added, “We found that [during the events of 11 September]
our clients were for the most part undersubscribed in terms of
their need for contingency work areas and networks and terminals…Plans need to be updated every six months.”35 Hussong,
the senior member from System Research Applications, Inc.,
however recommends rewriting contingency plan procedures
at least every ﬁve years to ensure requirements are kept current,
new technologies are utilized, and “fresh eyes…look at old solutions to new problems.”36
The actual contingency plan must be available during a contingency. As one ﬁrm discovered during 11 September, the
only copy of the contingency plan was located in the World
Trade Center ofﬁces, and at another organization, said Strohl
Systemsʼ Banker, “they had copies of the recovery plan on the
network in New York and London and Tokyo, but they could
not get to any of them [due to the lack of telecommunication].”37
However, there is a difﬁcult balance to maintain between availability and protecting the organization. To ensure the plan is
available accessible, organizations must have multiple copies
of contingency plans available as hard copies, on different networks, and even on multiple hard drives. However, due to the
proprietary issues and other classiﬁcations issues, the organization must be careful not to broadcast the plan to uncontrolled
locations. This is an essential point for the planner to keep in
mind as they disseminate the completed plan to the personnel
in the organization.
Option For Air Force Space Command
A single, common training, evaluation, and CFM information system for all of AFSPC would be subject to risk from a
contingency just like any other system. However, if risk assessment is conducted and a contingency plan is built AFSPCs
leaders could accept the risk of a contingency occurring.
One way to immediately reduce the risk of a contingency is
to wisely choose the location of the database server based upon
what was learned about contingency plan building. Utilizing
the Air Forceʼs Global Combat Support System (GCSS) is one
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way to apply this knowledge. According to the Warﬁghting Integration and Chief Information Ofﬁcer, Knowledge Information Management Branch at Headquarters Air Force, the GCSS
provides a central enterprise server bus to house data that permits authorized users access via remote sign on; it is a set of enterprise information services and is protected by multiple layers
of security.38 Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is
responsible for parts of GCSS. DISA hosts GCSS on a server
farm located in Alabama with data shadowing occurring with a
server farm at Wright Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio. There
is a third server farm proposed for San Antonio, Texas which
will have the same data shadowing service. Data and transactions will therefore be stored in three different geographical
locations, signiﬁcantly reducing risks. AFSPC users would access the single, common information system via remote sign on
through the Air Force Portal Graphic User Interface.
Housing the database on the GCSS is only one way to reduce
the risks associated with this system and will increase leadership support. A full risk assessment and contingency plan
would need to be accomplished in order to further mitigate the
risk to an acceptable level.
Conclusion
Without contingency plans, organizations risk not being able
to survive or experience mission failure. Contingency plans
help an organization to determine what risks they are willing
to accept and what risks are unacceptable, providing the opportunity to take actions to mitigate unacceptable risks. Using
examples of what organizations experienced during 11 September, we have illustrated why a contingency plan is critical. As
highlighted, the loss of capabilities for organizations without
a plan or those with untested plans is devastating. Before a
contingency plan can be initiated, a risk assessment must be
accomplished as it identiﬁes the assets and procedures that are
important to the organization, attempts to determine types and
chances of a contingency occurring, and assigns a value level
to the asset or process so the organization knows where to focus its efforts. Only after this has occurred can a contingency
plan be built. A number of different approaches exist to build
a contingency plan. The blueprint presented here is a logical
and thorough method. An incident response plan is designed
to establish procedures to deal with the event immediately. A
disaster response plan is the next step. This will ensure there
are procedures available if the contingency cannot be contained
with the incident response plan. The last plan to be designed
is the business continuity plan which ensures the organization
can restore operations if the contingency renders the primary
site unusable. With the contingency plan, comprised of these
components, an organization is prepared to successfully face
almost any risk.
Armed with this information, an organization will be able
to face a contingency and survive. Now you can stop staring
out the window and begin to effectively address some of leadershipsʼ possible concerns regarding the implementation of a
single, common training, evaluation, and CFM information
system and ﬁnally make the dream a reality. Each of us has a
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responsibility to contribute to the survivability of their organization. Can your organization survive a disaster?
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